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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
vs. 
TIMOTHY CRAIG GODFREY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20080733 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction following the entry of a 
conditional guilty plea, pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), 
wherein Mr. Godfrey pleaded guilty to a third degree felony, Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court, entered in this matter on August 18, 2008. Mr. Godfrey 
specifically preserved his right to appeal the single order of the Judge denying two 
pre-trial motions. R. 247-54. 
The single Order sought to be reviewed denies each of the following: (1) 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Unlawfully Seized Evidence; and (2) Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. See Addenda A for the Ruling and Order of December 6, 
2007, prepared by the trial court denying both motions of Defendant. R. 136-40. 
Importantly, at the January 7, 2008, hearing the trial court overruled the objection 
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of Mr. Godfrey to the Ruling and Order denying his request to alter or correct the 
prior order. The Court also denied the request for a further evidentiary hearing. 
R. 142-43. For a copy of the Transcript of January 7, 2008, see Addendum C; R. 
158. In short, on January 7, 2008, the trial court denied a Motion to Reconsider 
and in essence reaffirmed its Findings and Order from December 6, 2007. R. 156-
57. 
Mr. Godfrey had filed a Petition for Permission for Interlocutory Appeal 
which this Court denied on March 4, 2008. R. 225-26. After remand, he then 
entered his conditional plea before the Honorable Judge Maughan on May 12, 
2008, where he specifically preserved his right to appeal the order denying his two 
motions. R. 247-54; R.275 (transcript of May 12, 2008). Sentencing was held on 
August 18, 2008, where Defendant was placed on probation, and then the probated 
sentence was stayed pending this appeal. R. 260-65, 268-69; R. 275 (transcript of 
August 18,2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Timothy Craig Godfrey was charged by Information with Illegal 
possession of a Controlled Substance, psilocin mushroom, a third degree felony; 
Illegal Possession of a Controlled Substance, marijuana, a class B misdemeanor; 
and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor subsequent to a 
warrant being served by officers from Salt Lake City Narcotics Detectives, 
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assisted by SWAT officers, at the residence located at 4521 South Julep Drive at 
approximately 9:40 p.m. on May 24, 2005. R. 1-3. 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant (found at Addendum B; R. 
42-44) alleged the development of information which began during a controlled 
purchase of methamphetamine. The affidavit contains no information whatsoever 
about the controlled purchase or the development of that information, not even the 
date or time. The affidavit only concludes that after the controlled purchase of 
methamphetamine, the suspects (plural) were followed to 4521 South Julep Drive. 
The affidavit states (multiple times) that the suspects (plural) were driving a white 
Pontiac Grand Am with the license plate of 634 VJV. The affidavit states that the 
Grand Am pulled into the garage of the residence at 4521 South Julep Drive and 
that the driver (a single suspect) was seen entering the front door. 
The affidavit next indicates that on May 23, 2005, during the early morning 
hours, narcotic detectives conducted a trash cover at 4521 South Julep Drive 
claiming they located residency documents for a Mr. Godfrey identifying the Julep 
Drive address and a single marijuana stem from numerous sacks taken from a 
garbage can located directly in front of the address. Again, no evidence of, nor 
further discussion regarding, methamphetamine is produced. The controlled buy 
is not mentioned again. 
From July of 2006 until May of 2007, Mr. Godfrey was represented in this 
case by different counsel whom he removed from the case to hire new counsel 
herein. R.9-10; R. 56-57. 
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After new counsel acquired discovery, Mr. Godfrey filed a Motion to 
Suppress and requested a Franks hearing based on the inadequacies contained in 
the Affidavit in Support of the Warrant. R. 89-97. Mr. Godfrey urged that the 
Affidavit is insufficient to support probable cause, specifically when the material 
misstatements, material misrepresentations and material omissions are removed 
from the affidavit and a new determination of probable cause conducted by the 
Court. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1986). 
Mr. Godfrey's Motion requesting the Franks hearing detailed the specific 
nature of the inadequacies and insufficiencies of the Affidavit as follows: 
MISREPRESENTATIONS/OMISSIONS/MISTATEMENTS: 
A critical misrepresentation in the affidavit appears when the affiant 
exclaims that "[t]he suspects [plural] were driving a white Pontiac Grand 
Am with a Utah Plate 634 VJV." The very next sentence in the affidavit 
states that "[f]he Grand Am pulled into the garage of the listed residence 
and the driver was seen entering the front door." This is a false and 
misleading misrepresentation and significant omission, very potentially 
intentional, and at least with reckless disregard for the truth as the 
Defendant's license plate to his Grand Am has a different plate, 607 VGV. 
However, the affiant by context, both expressed and implied, critically 
misrepresented to the magistrate that this is the same vehicle that had been 
at a controlled buy of methamphetamine. The affiant misrepresents that 
officers followed the same car from the scene to the home when they could 
not have done so. To support that the affiant misrepresents the claim, the 
affidavit twice references following the controlled buy suspects (plural) but 
only the driver (singular) is observed exiting the vehicle and entering the 
home. The affiant omits and fails to even claim that the suspect vehicle 
was followed without interruption or loss of sight, which must have 
occurred. 
Moreover, the affiant omits any discussion of running the plate and finding 
a suspect name, address of registration or criminal history associated with 
the vehicle. Nor does the affiant ever purport to connect the vehicle by 
registration or name to the address in question. This failure to connect the 
vehicle, person or address is an omission of significance designed 
intentionally or recklessly to effectively cause a magistrate to assess 
probable cause where none exists. 
The control buy itself is an omission of significance and a 
misrepresentation to the magistrate as no specific information is provided 
about this particular event other than the conclusory statement that 
information was developed. No details of the control, if any, are provided. 
No time frame is provided to permit an analytical connection from the 
event. No details at all are included in the affidavit to demonstrate that 
officers have probable cause that Mr. Godfrey is one of the same people as 
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the suspects in the controlled buy. The claim of the methamphetamine 
allegation without a connection to the defendant operates as a 
misrepresentation to only heighten the seriousness of the allegations to 
sway granting the warrant. 
Another important misrepresentation is that the garbage sacks seized and 
confiscated from in front of the property necessarily belong to the suspect 
that was followed or whether they belonged to any other number of 
individuals who may reside at the residence. The affiant also 
misrepresents the essential facts surrounding residency documents found in 
the garbage for a Mr. Godfrey. Importantly, insignificant envelopes 
(apparent junk mail) from a previous mail delivery addressed to a Deloy 
Godfrey, not Timothy Godfrey, were found in the garbage though the 
affiant fails to clarify and just omits this fact from the affidavit for the 
magistrate misrepresenting its importance and connection to the suspect. 
Further, once the affiant indicates he has found a single stem of marijuana, 
he asserts without cause or articulated connection (despite the prior claim 
and impetus from a methamphetamine buy) to assert exactly why a 
marijuana stem would support the affiant's claimed suspicion for finding 
evidence of its distribution, including sales transactions, currency and the 
like would be found at this residence. A single stem of a marijuana, (any 
detail of its size omitted), without more does not a dealer make. Instead 
the affiant relies only on his claim that when other warrants have been 
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executed, based on his training and experience that these kinds of items 
have been found. 
Mr. Godfrey urged the trial court that these errors, individually and/or 
collectively, provide sufficient proffer under the above authority to merit an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks and Nielsen regarding the sufficiency of 
the affidavit. Mr. Godfrey asserted that extracting the material misrepresentations, 
misstatements and omissions from the affidavit would render the affidavit and 
resulting search warrant constitutionally invalid. 
In preparation for a hearing on the matter Mr. Godfrey requested additional 
discovery, including the police reports prepared about the controlled buy. R. 70-
72. Counsel specifically desired information to explain how the controlled buy of 
methamphetamine permitted officers to investigate Mr. Godfrey (a single 
individual) driving a white Pontiac Grand Am with license plates of 607 VGV, 
when the affidavit describes the methamphetamine controlled buy suspects' 
(plural) vehicle as a white Grand Am with an identified license plate of 634 VJV. 
The State subsequently informed counsel that there were no police reports 
available from the controlled buy. R. 275, transcript dated August 27, 2007 at pp. 
2-3. 
Mr. Godfrey then filed a Motion to Dismiss the case against him based on 
the failure of the State to produce the reports from the controlled buy of 
methamphetamine which law enforcement cited as the impetus of the investigation 
which resulted in police following a vehicle with a different license plate, and 
7 
different number of passengers resulting in a search of a trash can with a single 
stem of marijuana to justify the preparation of the search warrant in this case. R. 
100-109. 
Argument was scheduled for November 29, 2007. Witnesses were present 
that day but none were called. R. 275, transcript of November 29, 2007, pp. 1-29. 
The trial court heard argument and took the issues under advisement. Id. at 28. 
Following the argument on the motions on November 29, 2007, attorneys for both 
sides met with the witnesses/officers present and learned that field notes and a 
report had been available but were no longer available due to a computer glitch. 
The trial court denied Mr. Godfrey's request to present that evidence to the court. 
The court then subsequently ruled, despite a motion requesting an additional 
evidentiary hearing, inter alia, that "the defendant has failed to make a 
fundamental preliminary showing, namely that police reports of the controlled buy 
ever existed. Therefore the defendant cannot show that the reports were lost or 
destroyed or that they would have potentially been exculpatory." See Addendum 
A, Ruling and Order at 4; R. 136-40; Addendum A. Mr. Godfrey filed an 
objection to this Ruling and Order complaining that the court did not allow him to 
call the officers and he requested an evidentiary hearing and reconsideration of his 
Motions. R. 144-54; Addendum D for a copy of Mr. Godfrey's Motion. 
The trial court overruled the objection and denied requests to alter or 
correct the Ruling and Order; the trial court denied the motion for a new 
evidentiary hearing as well. Transcript of January 7, 2008 at 7; Addendum C. 
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Mr. Godfrey then filed a Petition for Permission for Interlocutory Appeal 
which this Court denied on March 4, 2008. R. 225-26. After remand, he then 
entered his conditional plea before the Honorable Judge Maughan on May 12, 
2008, where he specifically preserved his right to appeal the order denying his two 
motions. R. 247-54. Sentencing was held on August 18, 2008, where Defendant 
was placed on probation, and then the probated sentence was stayed pending this 
appeal. R. 260-65, 268-69; R. 275 (transcript of August 18, 2008). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it refused Defendant an evidentiary hearing to 
establish the information necessary for a Franks hearing. Sufficient information is 
available to comprehend that false statement, material misrepresentation and 
omissions exist which should be removed from the warrant and a redetermination 
of probable cause analyzed. Had the trial court done so, it would have invalidated 
the warrant. 
Police officers preparing the search warrant affidavit in the case referenced 
a controlled buy which they conducted the night they became interested in Mr. 
Godfrey as a suspect. Mr. Godfrey contends that he became a suspect only after 
police mistook his vehicle for a vehicle involved in the control buy. Discovery 
requests were made and eventually returned information that disclosed that a 
written report of the control buy did exist but was destroyed in "some sort of 
computer malfunction" and was no longer available. R. 158 at pp. 2-3 (transcript 
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of January 7. 2008.) The trial court's refusal to hear that testimony and the denial 
of the motion to dismiss was in error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that Mr. Godfrey failed 
to show sufficient misrepresentations, omissions and misstatements 
to support the requested Franks hearing. 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978), the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that a defendant has a right to an evidentiary hearing where 
he or she makes a preliminary showing that the affidavit supporting the warrant 
contained a false statement included either intentionally or with reckless disregard 
for the truth. If the defendant can establish the false statement by a preponderance 
of the evidence at the hearing then the false information is to be excised from the 
affidavit and the reviewing court must reevaluate the probable cause 
determination. If probable cause does not exist without the excised false 
information, the warrant must be voided and the seized evidence suppressed "to 
the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit." Id. 
Notably, Utah law has long since required the same treatment. In State v. 
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), the Court, citing Franks, acknowledged that 
"[fjalse statements in a probable cause affidavit made knowingly, intentionally or 
recklessly, can invalidate a warrant issued in reliance thereon, [citation omitted]." 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert denied. 107 S.Ct. 1565, the 
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Utah Supreme Court importantly followed the federal position from Franks but 
extended the analysis to include material omissions as well as material 
misrepresentations. The Court expounded: 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only of the need for accuracy 
in the information provided to a magistrate in support of an application for 
a search warrant, but also of the absolute truthfulness of any statements 
made under oath. 
Nielsen. 727 P.2d at 191. 
Federal and State law require the trial court to review the findings of a 
magistrate particularly examining the identified portions of the affidavit proffered 
as establishing the preliminary showing of intentional false statements, 
misstatements, omissions or statements made with reckless disregard for the truth. 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190-91 (courts must be particularly 
vigilant in assessing claims that a police officer has misrepresented information in 
the affidavit). 
The United States Supreme Court explained: 
[A] flat ban on impeachment of veracity could denude the probable cause 
requirement of all real meaning. The requirement that a warrant not issue 
"but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," would be 
reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified 
allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the 
magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was 
worthwhile. 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 168. 
The importance of the trial court's review of the Magistrate's decision, by 
permitting the evidentiary hearing, is emphasized by the Court when it further 
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explained that we hold evidentiary hearings once a showing is made of a material 
false statement, misstatement or omission precisely because the pre-search 
proceeding is necessarily ex parte, and less vigorous than an adversarial 
proceeding. Id. at 169. The Court concluded: 
The pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, because of 
the understandable desire to act before the evidence disappears; this 
urgency will not always permit the magistrate to make an extended 
independent examination of the affiant or other witnesses. 
Allowing an evidentiary hearing after a suitable preliminary proffer of 
material falsity, would not diminish the importance or solemnity of the 
warrant issuing process. It is the ex parte nature of the initial hearing 
rather than the magistrate's capacity, that is the reason for the review. A 
magistrate's determination is presently subject to review before trial as to 
the sufficiency without any interference with the dignity of the magistrate 
function. 
Id. at 169-70. 
Specifically, Mr. Godfrey asserted to the court that the following 
prejudicial defects are contained within the affidavit supporting the search warrant 
in this case. This information is repeated here from the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress for convenience as presented to the trial court. R. 89-97. 
MISREPRESENTATIONS/OMISSIONS/MISTATEMENTS: 
A critical misrepresentation in the affidavit appears when the affiant exclaims that 
"[t]he suspects [plural] were driving a white Pontiac Grand Am with a Utah Plate 
634 VJV." The very next sentence in the affidavit states that "[t]he Grand Am 
pulled into the garage of the listed residence and the driver was seen entering the 
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front door." This is a false misrepresentation, very potentially intentional, and at 
least with reckless disregard for the truth as the Defendant's license plate to his 
Grand Am has a different plate, 607 VGV. However, the affiant by context, both 
expressed and implied, critically misrepresented to the magistrate that this is the 
same vehicle that had been at a controlled buy of methamphetamine. 
The affiant misrepresents that officers followed the same car from the scene 
to the home when they could not have done so. To support that the affiant 
misrepresents the claim here, the affidavit twice references following suspects 
(plural) but only the driver (singular) is observed exiting the vehicle and entering 
the home. The affiant omits and fails to even claim that the suspect vehicle was 
followed without interruption or loss of sight, which most assuredly had to have 
occurred. 
Moreover, the affiant omits any discussion of running the plate and finding 
a suspect name, address of registration or criminal history associated with the 
vehicle. Nor does the affiant ever purport to connect the vehicle by registration or 
name to the address in question. This failure to connect the vehicle, person or 
address is an omission of significance designed intentionally or recklessly 
effective to cause a magistrate to assess probable cause where none exists. 
The control buy itself is an omission of significance and a 
misrepresentation to the magistrate as no specific information is provided about 
this particular event other than the conclusory statement that information was 
developed. No details of the control, if any, are provided. No time frame is 
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provided to permit an analytical connection from the event. No details at all are 
included in the affidavit to demonstrate that officers have probable cause that Mr. 
Godfrey is one of the same people as the suspects in the controlled buy. An 
allegation does not even exists as to whether the suspects are the sellers or the 
buyers. 
Another important misrepresentation is that the garbage sacks seized and 
confiscated from in front of the property necessarily belong to the suspect that was 
followed or whether they belonged to any other number of individuals who may 
reside at the residence. In fact, the affiant also misrepresents the essential facts 
surrounding residency documents found in the garbage for a Mr. Godfrey. 
Importantly, insignificant envelopes (apparent junk mail) from a previous mail 
delivery addressed to a Deloy Godfrey, not a Timothy Godfrey, were found in the 
garbage though the affiant fails to clarify and just omits this fact from the affidavit 
for the magistrate misrepresenting its importance and connection to the suspect. 
Further, once the affiant indicates he has found a single stem of marijuana, 
he asserts without cause or articulated connection (despite the prior claim and 
impetus from a methamphetamine buy) to assert exactly why marijuana or any 
paraphernalia related to marijuana possession, and amazingly any suspicion for its 
distribution, including sales transactions, currency and the like would be found at 
this residence. A single stem of a marijuana, (any detail of size omitted), without 
more does not a dealer make. Instead the affiant relies only on his claim that when 
other warrants have been executed, based on his training and experience that these 
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kinds of items have been found. Presumptively, other executed warrants have 
been supported by probable cause. 
These errors, individually and/or collectively, provide sufficient proffer 
under the above authority to merit an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks and 
Nielsen regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit. Extracting the material 
misrepresentations, misstatements and omissions will render the affidavit and 
resulting search warrant constitutionally invalid. 
In Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, 149 P.3d 352, the Supreme Court 
decided a case involving record keeping practices for search warrants and search 
warrant affidavits in the Fourth District Court. While not on direct point with our 
case at bar, several comments of the Court assist in reminding and addressing the 
importance of search warrants and affidavits in our judicial system and the critical 
rights involved. In one such statement the Court reminded: 
In addition, this issue is one that affects the public interest. Anderson's 
petition raises significant issues regarding the integrity of the court's 
record-keeping systems, including the potential for law enforcement to 
alter search warrants and supporting documentation. It also raises serious 
issues relating to an individual's right to challenge the validity of a 
warrant. Because the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is a right guaranteed by the United States and Utah 
Constitutions, maintaining that right is a public interest of the highest 
order. 
Id. at TI 12. Mr. Godfrey seeks only to challenge the validity of the warrant 
utilized against him but has been denied the opportunity to do so. 
Accordingly, Mr. Godfrey respectfully urges that this Court correct the 
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decision of the trial court to disregard the claimed material omissions, 
misstatements and misrepresentations that are in error. He requests that this Court 
correct that error and the requests that the matter be remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing to be scheduled to resolve these evidentiary questions and the necessity to 
suppress the evidence. 
II. Whether the trial court incorrectly denied Mr. Godfrey's motion 
to dismiss based on the loss or destruction of evidence 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the destruction of evidence 
under a state constitutional analysis. In State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 45, 162 P.3d 
1106, the Court stated: 
It is a matter of clear Utah law that criminal defendants are entitled to 
information possessed by the State to aid in their defense. Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure imposes broad obligations on 
prosecutors to produce such information or make it available to a 
defendant. Utah R.Crim. P. 16. We have on numerous occasions enforced 
its requirements, and we noted in State v. Knisht: 
The prosecutor's good faith should not have had any impact on the 
trial court's determination of whether the prosecutor had violated his 
discovery duties.... [T]he prosecutor's good faith ignorance does not 
excuse non-disclosure. If any weight were given to good faith 
ignorance, it would only encourage after-the-fact justifications for 
nondisclosure. 
Id. at If 40 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 n. 5 (Utah 1987). 
The Tiedemann Court then outlined 
We have identified several factors under rule 16 to guide a trial court's 
decision on a motion to exclude prosecution evidence because of a failure 
to fully disclose. These factors are also relevant to a motion, like the one 
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here, to dismiss charges for destruction of evidence. The nonexclusive 
factors we consider under rule 16 are 
(1) the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the 
existing evidence] is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the 
omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or 
strategy that could prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of the 
prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating the facts, 
and (4) the extent to which appropriate defense investigation would 
have discovered the omitted or misstated evidence. 
Id. Our approach under rule 16 should govern the destruction of evidence, 
and the culpability or bad faith of the state should be only one 
consideration, not a bright line test, as a matter of due process under article 
1, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Id. at "[j 41 (citation omitted). 
Importantly, the Court remanded Tiedemann for the trial court's review of 
the case. The Court noted that a balancing necessarily must be conducted where 
the touchstone of the balancing process is fundamental fairness. Id. at j^ 45. The 
Court indicated that where a defendant could show a reasonable probability that 
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, that two of the above factors 
necessarily required a balancing. 
(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the 
degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the 
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and 
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole, 
including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
Id. at 1f 44. 
Finally, the Court noted as pivotal to the balancing the following awareness 
and analysis: 
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If the behavior of the State in a given case is so reprehensible as to warrant 
sanction, a sanction might be available even where prejudice to the 
defendant is slight or only speculative. If prejudice to the defendant, on the 
other hand, is extreme, fairness may require sanction even where there is 
no wrongdoing on the part of the State. In between those extremes, we 
have confidence that trial judges can strike a balance that preserves 
defendants' constitutional rights without undue hardship to the prosecution. 
Id. at If 45. 
Mr. Godfrey urges that the trial court failed in applying these state 
constitutional due process principles from Tiedemann to his facts and requires a 
dismissal of the charges against him. Initially, an examination of the first four 
nonexclusive factors, even absent an allegation of bad faith on the part of the 
prosecution, illustrates the viability of the motion to dismiss. 
Factors one, two and four are each illustrative of how we arrived to this 
point in the case. It is precisely because the prosecution's case is actually 
inaccurate, consisting of both misstatements and omissions from the police 
investigation and the affidavit in support of the warrant that the defense began to 
examine the state's case out of a search for fairness. Through seeking to uncover 
through his own defense investigation, Mr. Godfrey appropriately discovered the 
lost, missing or destroyed reports which explain the origin of the case; and it is 
those reports that will reveal the origin of Mr. Godfrey as a suspect in the matter. 
These initial factors, while clarifying that it is not the prosecutor but the law 
enforcement personnel who bares the culpability for the omissions, misstatements 
and lost reports, nonetheless unquestionably reveal that the search for fundamental 
fairness in the case has been jeopardized by the failure to produce these reports 
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which provide the underlying support to question the sufficiency and correctness 
of the affidavit in support of the warrant. 
While Tiedemann does not discuss a Franks hearing situation, the irony that 
misstatements and omissions are of such concern in the state constitutional 
analysis for lost or destroyed evidence demonstrates the dispositive nature of this 
motion to dismiss. The two balancing considerations left to the trial courts to 
perform require the analysis and measurement of the culpability of the prosecution 
versus the prejudice to the accused. Id. at f^ 44. Mr. Godfrey notes the prejudice 
to his case is so extreme, demonstrated by the inability to have conducted a Franks 
hearing and directly compare the facts from the reports of the controlled buy with 
the absence of any facts about that buy contained in the affidavit supporting the 
search warrant. That prejudice to Mr. Godfrey is extreme enough to justify 
dismissal without any wrongdoing on the part of the prosecution. 
However, examining the role the prosecution has played in this matter 
demonstrates that law enforcement, an integral part of the prosecution team, has at 
a minimum negligently failed to provide discovery of one of the most basic 
investigation techniques of an alleged drug dealing scenario. Sooner or later law 
enforcement must produce those reports either in support of or to support the 
eventual request and receipt of a search warrant. Reducing the details of the 
controlled buy to writing for the analysis of legal sufficiency is axiomatic. Failure 
to produce those reports in this matter demonstrates that the sufficiency of the 
investigation has predictably been assailed and is demonstrative of the negligence 
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or culpability of the prosecution team in Mr. Godfrey's case. Dismissal is 
warranted. 
A possible alternative approach or remedy for Mr. Godfrey on these facts 
would be to determine that the unsupported controlled buy information could be 
removed from the affidavit as part of the Franks determination. However, that 
remedy would be inadequate as law enforcement personnel would then be allowed 
to testify and fill in the blanks occurring after the buy in an after-the-fact fashion 
unencumbered by the insight obtained from contemporaneous police reports 
detailed at the time of the events and at the base of the investigation. "Scrutiny 
has revealed that the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection for the 
accused." State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). The Tiedemann 
Court echoed the potential harm that would come from giving the prosecution 
team a pass on arguments of good faith. As quoted earlier: 
The prosecutor's good faith should not have had any impact on the trial 
court's determination of whether the prosecutor had violated his discovery 
duties.... [T]he prosecutor's good faith ignorance does not excuse non-
disclosure. If any weight were given to good faith ignorance, it would only 
encourage after-the-fact justifications for nondisclosure. 
Id. at 1f 40, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d at 918 n. 5. 
Because the required constitutional balancing weighs so heavily in favor of 
Mr. Godfrey's need to have the requested discoverable information and because of 
the irreparable harm to his case that has resulted from the failure to produce it, this 
Court should dismiss the case against him. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, for all or any of the above arguments, Mr. Godfrey asserts his 
rights against unreasonable search and seizure were compromised. He suffered 
prejudice therefrom and he respectfully requests this Court order that his case be 
dismissed; or in the alternative, that the matter be remanded with an order to the 
district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the Franks issue and the lost or 
destroyed reports. 
DATED this 
l& 
day of March, 2009. 
JASON SCHATZ 
Attorney for Mr. Godfrey 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ _ day of March, 2009,1 have caused one 
original and seven true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and two 
additional copies to be mailed first class to the following: 
The Office of the Attorney General 
Attn: Kris C. Leonard, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellee 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
I delivered the number of copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Assistant Attorney General, Kris C. Leonard, as indicated above this day of 
March, 2009. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : RULING AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 061904466 
v. : Judge PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
TIMOTHY CRAIG GODFREY, : Date: December 3, 2007 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on the defendant's Motions to Suppress Evidence Unlawfully 
Seized and to Dismiss. Having considered the memoranda and the arguments raised at the November 29 
hearing, the Court DENIES the defendant's Motions. 
/. Motion to Suppress Evidence Unlawfully Seized 
The defendant argues that he is entitled to a Franh hearing to determine if suppression is appropriate 
here. Franh v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) entitles adefendant to an evidentiary hearing to challenge 
a search warrant" if the defendant can establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit supporting a search warrant 
made a false statement intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (ii) the affidavit 
is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause after the misstatement is set aside." State v. Niels on, 
727P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). This is a fairly heavy burden. A defendant is not allowed a hearing based 
on mere conjecture. Instead, a defendant must first show that the warrant contains material misstates and 
that the affiant made the misstates intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. 
To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and 
must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations 
of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be 
accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out specifically the portion of the 
warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement 
of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses 
should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or 
innocent mistake are insufficient. 
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Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. While the defendant attempts to meet this burden by listing all the 
"misrepresentations, omissions,.and misstatements" in the warrant, this falls short of the required showing 
for a Franks hearing. 
First, many of the alleged "omissions" don't qualify for Franks scrutiny. An omission is only subject 
to the Franlcs analysis "when a misstatement occurs because information is omitted." See Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
at 191. Here the many of the "omissions" do not create misstatements. Instead, the defendant's arguments 
go to whether the magistrate had probable cause to issue a warrant with the information given. For example, 
the defendant argues that the affidavit omits any discussion of whether the officer(s) did a check on the 
license plate or attempted to connect it to the residence. Lack of evidence on this point doesn't seem to 
create a "misstatement" in the warrant. 
Second, for those misstatements, etc. that could be material, the defendant does not provide "an offer 
of proof of "deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth." 
Finally, the Court finds that, even if it were to strike the material the defendant complains of in the 
wan-ant, a Franks hearing would still be unnecessary because the warrant still establishes probable cause 
to search the residence at issue. The redacted warrant would still establish that officers found a marijuana 
stem in the trash of the residence along with some mail addressed to the residence. Even if the mail did not 
establish that the defendant (a) lived at the residence or (b) had possessed the marijuana stem, this evidence 
does establish sufficient probable cause to show that someone in the residence had possessed and discarded 
the marijuana stem and that more marijuana and/or paraphernalia would be found in the residence. 
Therefore, the defendant cannot show that "the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
after the misstatements are] set aside." 
The defendant also argues that he is entitled to a hearing to determine if the warrant was properly 
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served. He asserts that it was to be served during the daytime but that it was not. He agrees that the wan-ant 
was served at approximately 9:40 pm. This was during the "daytime" according to Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 40(a)(1) and so it was properly served. There is no evidentiary issue for the Court to resolve on 
this matter. 
2. Motion to Dismiss 
Next, the defendant argues that the Utah State Constitution requires dismissal here because the 
defendant cannot obtain discovery of any police reports supporting the controlled methamphetamine buy 
referenced in the warrant.1 The Court finds that this argument is also without merit. 
State v. Tiedemarm, 2007 UT 49,162 P.3d 1106 controls the analysis here. Tiedemann holds that 
"hi cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be 
exculpatory, we find it necessary to require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction 
or loss of the evidence including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the 
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the 
context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence." Id. at |44. Additionally, 
the court in Tiedemann indicated that analysis of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 should govern in cases 
involving destruction of evidence. Under rule 16, if evidence is not disclosed to the defendant, the court 
should balance a number of factors to determine if dismissal is appropriate, including: 
(1) the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing evidence] is 
actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense 
1
 Federal constitutional analysis would be governed here by Youngblood v. Arizona, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). In a cases such as this where the defendant is not aware of the contents of 
any such reports, the defendant would have to show that the police or other government 
actors acted in bad faith in destroying said reports. The Court finds, and the defendant 
apparently concedes, that the defendant cannot prevail under the federal constitution because 
i- - - - i i i x . : * u 
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counsel into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability 
of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating the facts, and (4) the 
extent to which appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted 
or misstated evidence. 
Id. at 1J41 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
The Court finds here that the defendant has failed to make a fundamental preliminary 
showing, namely that police reports of the controlled buy ever existed. Therefore, the defendant 
cannot show that the reports were lost or destroyed or that they would have potentially been 
exculpatory. 
The Court also finds that any police reports, etc. regarding the controlled buy are simply not 
relevant and so dismissal is not appropriate under Tiedemann. Specifically, the defendant was not 
charged with any crime related to the controlled buy, the State has indicated that it does not intend 
to introduce evidence regarding the controlled buy at the trial, and the controlled buy information 
is immaterial to a finding that the warrant here was supported by probable cause. Therefore, the 
Court finds that the defendant will not be prejudiced without this information and so there is no 
reason for dismissal. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 061904466 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JASON A SCHATZ 
Attorney DEF 
57 W 200 S STE 200 
AMERICAN PLAZA II 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail JACEY SKINNER 
Attorney PLA 
111 E BROADWAY STE 4 00 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-2714 
Dated this (0 day of ll&&*^6^t--/, 2Q&2_. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
m AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That on the premises of 4521 South Julep Drive (480 East) further described as a single family 
dwelling. It is constructed of red brick with wood trim painted red in color. The roof is 
constructed with tan colored asphalt shingles. The residence is located on the east side of Julep 
Drive (480 East) and is the second structure south of 4500 South. The numbers '4521' are 
displayed directly above the front door and are displayed adjacent to the front door to the south, 
against the red brick. Both sets of numbers are silver in color. The front door faces west. There 
is a black wrought iron storm door prior to the front door. To include all rooms, attics, 
basements, and other parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, 
and outbuildings of any kind located upon the curtilage of the property. 
In the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana, further described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or 
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia 
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana. 
Articles of personal property tending to establish possession of a controlled substance and 
document sales of a controlled substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and 
other documentation of sales of a controlled substance; articles tending to establish the identity 
of persons in control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility 
receipts, and addressed envelopes, and any other fruits or instrumentality's of the crimes of 
possession or distribution of a controlled substance. 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
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as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City police officer and has been a police officer for over 10 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Pioneer Division 
Bicycle Patrol. Your affiant has had training in narcotic identification and in the investigation of 
narcotic related offenses. Your affiant's specialized training includes the Utah Police Academy 
(Police Officer Standards and Training) and Rocky Mountain H.I.D.T.A. (High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area). Your affiant has been part of several drug related cases, many of which were 
felonies. Your affiant was a member of the St. George Police Department SWAT team. While a 
member of the SWAT team, your affiant conducted numerous surveillances and executed 
numerous narcotic search warrants. 
• Information was developed during a controlled purchase of memamphetamine. After the 
controlled purchase, the suspects were followed to 4521 South Julep Drive (480 East). The 
suspects were driving a white Pontiac Grand Am bearing Utah plate 634VJV. The Grand Am 
pulled into the garage of the listed residence and the driver was seen entering the front door of 
the listed residence. 
Narcotics Detectives conducted a trash cover at the listed residence during the early morning 
hours of May 23, 2005. Narcotics Detectives located a garbage can directly in front of the listed 
residence at the street curb. Detectives removed numerous sacks of garbage from the can. The 
garbage sacks were taken to a secure location and searched. Detectives located inside one of the 
garbage sacks, numerous residency documents for a Mr. Godfrey with the address 4521 South 
Julep Drive (480 East) and a marijuana stem. Detectives gave your affiant the recovered items 
from the trash. The stem field tested positive for marijuana. The items were photographed and 
booked into evidence by your affiant. 
Your affiant desires to enter 4521 South Julep Drive (480 East), and search for marijuana, 
marijuana paraphernalia and other items related to the illegal possession of marijuana. The 
paraphernalia includes such items as rolling papers, plastic baggies, pipe, tubes, or "bongs" used 
to smoke marijuana. Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana 
and scales used to weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH A . T 
PAGE - 3 -
items are almost always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances 
have been executed. 
Your affiant desires to search for records, both written and electronic, of marijuana sales, 
residency papers, and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with narcotic 
investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts purchased and 
drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that marijuana is sold for 
money or stolen property. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the. court 
by Deputy District A t t o r n e v N ^ Q ^ /9%fr^k&V fcffffyJ[}*l 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items 
during the day time hours. 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^ dayo^fl 2005. 
Judge of the Third 
District Court 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on January 7, 2008) 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, could we call the Timothy 
Godfrey matter? 
THE COURT: Yes. So where are we going today? 
MR. SCHATZ: Well, your Honor, you should have received 
— I filed an objection to the Court's order, renewed request 
for evidentiary hearing and a motion to reconsider that was 
filed on December 23rd. 
Just so the Court is — I think it's pretty simple. 
One of the findings that the Court made in its order is that 
"The Court finds here that the defendant has failed to make a 
fundamental preliminary showing; namely that police reports 
of the controlled buy ever existed. Therefore, the defendant 
cannot show that the reports were lost or destroyed, or that 
they would have potentially been exculpatory." 
I object to that, because the only reason the defendant 
hasn't been able to establish that is because the Court has not 
given him the opportunity. The last time we were here with 
witnesses, Counsel and I took them out in the hallway after the 
Court refused to let us put them on the stand; and one of the 
witnesses explicitly verified that yes, in fact, some sort of 
a written report did exist of this controlled buy; but due to 
some sort of computer malfunction, it's no longer available. 
So I object to the Court making a finding that we 
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1 haven't shown that, when we simply haven't been given the 
2 opportunity; and I don't think there's any dispute that those 
3 reports didn't — that they did exist at one time. I think 
4 that's where this whole analysis has to start from. 
5 I know, your Honor, I've read the order and I know 
6 what the State's position is; but it's still our position that 
7 it's certainly relevant, and the reason why is because even 
8 from the affidavit of the search warrant, there's certain 
9 things that I think tip us off to the fact that in this case 
10 the officers followed the wrong car. 
11 The information in the affidavit says, "Information 
12 was developed during a controlled purchase of methamphetamine. 
13 After the controlled purchase, the suspects were followed to 
14 4521 South Julip Drive, 480 East. Suspects were driving a 
15 white Pontiac Grand Am bearing the Utah plate 634 VJV. The 
16 Grand Am pulled into the garage of the listed residents, and 
17 the driver was seen entering the front door of the listed 
18 residence." So we have officers following a car that had 
19 "suspects," plural, and then they follow it to a place where 
20 there was only one — 
21 THE COURT: Okay, I'm well aware of what's in the file. 
22 I mean, I've heard this, I've read this; so I know what you're 
23 saying. 
24 MR. SCHATZ: Well, and your Honor, I think certainly 
25 the validity of the warrant, if the officers followed the wrong 
1 car, and didn't — I mean, if they're following a car with 
2 three people, pull into the driveway and see a car with only 
3 one person, at that point any reasonable person would realize 
4 that they followed the wrong car. 
5 Plus, the officers have the ability to run the license 
6 plate. His license plate, he does drive a white Pontiac Grand 
7 Am, but it has a different license plate. So the officers 
8 could have checked that; and if they were following the wrong 
9 car, then I think it was inappropriate for them to do a garbage 
10 cover. I think that information definitely should be excluded 
11 from the warrant, and it should be looked at a second time. 
12 What I don't want to happen, your Honor, is to waste 
13 time — it's our intention, absolutely, to appeal this case, 
14 because we feel that there's an issue there; but I hate to have 
15 it go up to the Court and just simply be remanded back here so 
16 that we can have a factual determination of whether or not the 
17 reports actually existed. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. SCHATZ: Because we've done everything we could to 
20 try to get the Court to allow us to present that evidence, and 
21 you just haven't given us that opportunity. 
22 THE COURT: I don't think that's completely accurate. 
23 Ms. Skinner. 
24 MS. SKINNER: And your Honor, if I may just respond 
25 briefly, that these are the same arguments that we've heard 
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1 over and over again. I think the Court has made findings on 
2 every one of these issues. Primarily that there is no right 
3 to these reports. Whether or not they existed, there's no 
4 discovery right to reports m support of an affidavit The 
5 affidavit is the support that's there 
6 As far as the ability to present evidence, I think the 
7 Court accurately found that they did not There were witnesses 
8 here last time. I subpoenaed them. They were not present in 
9 the courtroom, and Mr. Schatz was not even aware they were here 
10 until the end of the hearing. He was not prepared to present 
11 evidence, did not present evidence; and it was inappropriate 
12 at the time, because before you're allowed to present that 
13 evidence, you must make that finding, which as the Court 
14 accurately determined, he did not do. So I don't think there's 
15 an issue left here to determine. 
16 THE COURT: Well, even if the reports in — I realize 
17 that's what the order says; and I guess going back I'd say, 
18 "You know what, that's irrelevant to the Court's decision." 
19 You know, on another tact, this is — this is very similar, 
20 m my mind, to a warrant issued by one agency, officers rely 
21 on it. As long as they think that the — they have a good 
22 faith belief that the warrant was properly executed, properly 
23 issued, they can act on that, even if it turns out later it 
24 was wrong. Your — there's Federal case law on that issue. 
25 In this case, all I have is your supposition that — 
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1 MR. SCHATZ: Well, and the reason. 
2 THE COURT: — that they're two Pontiacs, and it could 
3 have been differently, and it wasn't. So — 
4 MR. SCHATZ: Well, and the reason we can't — I 
5 understand that under Franks we have to have burden; but how 
6 can 1 meet that burden if I don't get any reports documenting 
7 what was done, I'm not allowed to put the witnesses on the 
8 stand? That's — I can't pull a rabbit out of a hat, and 
9 obviously — 
10 THE COURT: Well, I don't know that — I can't say that 
11 you're prevented from doing anything in terms of. evidence. I 
12 just know what was done. There's no motion to reconsider. I 
13 mean, that's — procedurally there's no — and so you need to 
14 do what you need to do. This is going to stand. 
15 MR. SCHATZ: Okay. Then, your Honor, then I think the 
16 best thing to do would be to set if for a status conference in 
17 30 days to give us the 20 days in which to file the petition 
18 for interlocutory appeal. 
19 THE COURT:.The — February 4th at 9 o'clock. Does that 
20 work, or do you want the next week? 
21 MR. SCHATZ: That will be fine, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MS. SKINNER: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 MR. SCHATZ: And your Honor, just so that we do — I 
25 think in order to pull the 20 days, we do need some sort of 
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formal order denying our objection and renewed request for 
2 evidentiary hearing. If I prepare that and send that over, can 
3 the Court sign that? 
4 THE COURT: You can prepare — 
5 MR. SCHATZ: Or can we just do a minute entry? 
6 THE COURT: — what you think you need, but I'm not — 
7 I'm not — you don't need an order denying your request for 
8 reconsideration. There's no such motion. So if that's what 
9 you're asking, I'm not going to sign that. 
10 MR. SCHATZ: Okay, thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, thanks. 
12 (Hearing concluded) 
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which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome 
thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the record, and 
therefore, the name associated with the statement may not be 
the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 15th day of January 2008. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2008 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
ADDENDUM D 
1 
JASON SCHATZ (Bar #9969) 
Schatz, Anderson & Uday, LLC 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
57 West 200 South, # 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 579-0600 
Facsimile: (801) 579-0606 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT—SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : OBJECTION TO ORDER, 
RENEWED REQUEST FOR 
Plaintiff, : EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 
AND MOTION TO 
v. : RECONSIDER 
TIMOTHY CRAIG GODFREY, : CASE NO. 061904466 
Defendant. : JUDGE PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
COMES NOW, JASON SCHATZ, attorney for the Defendant, Tim 
Godfrey, and hereby submits this Objection to the Court's Order dated December 
5, 2007, and moves this Court to Reconsider the Court's ruling dated December 5, 
2007, denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss. The 
Defendant further renews his Request for an Evidentiary Hearing on the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress. 
OBJECTION TO ORDER 
In its ruling entered on December 5, 2007, the Court indicated that it was 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss. The Court's 
ruling was based in part on the following finding by the Court: 
The court finds here that the Defendant has failed to make a 
fundamental preliminary showing, namely that police reports of the 
controlled buy ever existed. Therefore, the defendant cannot show that 
the reports were lost or destroyed or that they would have potentially 
been exculpatory. (See attached Ruling and Order pg. 4) 
It is the position of defense counsel that the Court's finding that the 
Defendant has failed to present evidence of the existence of a police report 
regarding the alleged controlled buy is improper and not supported by the facts of 
this case. 
Counsel for the Defendant has repeatedly requested documentation and 
written information from the prosecution and police regarding the controlled buy 
referenced in the Affidavit for Search Warrant used to obtain a search warrant to 
search the Defendant's home. (See Defendant's Supplemental Request for 
Discovery and Subpoena Duces Tecum) Further, defense counsel has repeatedly 
requested that the Court take evidence on the issue of whether or not police 
reports, field notes, or other written documentation surrounding the circumstances 
of the controlled buy referenced in the Affidavit for Search Warrant used to obtain 
a search warrant to search the Defendant's home. In fact, at the Motion Hearing in 
this matter on November 29th, 2007, the prosecution had subpoenaed two 
witnesses who were involved in the controlled buy and defense counsel requested 
several times that the court allow the parties to present evidence in the form of 
2 
witnesses testimony to determine if in fact any such reports or notes existed, 
however the court refused to allow any witnesses to be called. Despite defense 
counsel's repeated requests and the presence of the witnesses at court, the Court 
refused to allow defense counsel to call the witnesses to testify and the court 
refused to take any evidence. 
Following the hearing the attorneys for both parties spoke with the 
witnesses who were subpoenaed by the state and the witnesses verified that the 
primary officer had prepared some form of written report or field notes about the 
controlled buy but that those notes or report were no longer available due to a 
computer glitch but they did in fact at one time exist. Following this impromptu 
interview with the State's witnesses, defense counsel filed a formal Request for 
Further Evidentiary Hearing again requesting that the Court schedule a hearing to 
take evidence and testimony from witnesses regarding the existence of written 
reports and again the Court refused defense counsel's request at the December 
17 , 2007, hearing in this matter. 
Therefore, based on the facts and reasons set forth above, the Defendant 
objects to the Court's December 5th, 2007, Order and its Findings that "the 
Defendant has failed to make a fundamental preliminary showing, namely that 
police reports of the controlled buy ever existed. Therefore, the defendant cannot 
show that the reports were lost or destroyed or that they would have potentially 
been exculpatory." 
3 
RENEWED REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Based on the above, the Defendant respectfully requests that the Court set 
this matter for further evidentiary hearing so that the court can take evidence, in 
the form of witnesses testimony, on the issue of whether or not a police report, 
filed notes, or other written documentation was prepared by any police officers 
involved in and with regard to the alleged controlled drug buy that served as the 
basis for the Search Warrant which was executed on the Defendant's home which 
resulted in the discovery of evidence that is the basis of the current charges against 
the Defendant. The Defendant feels that this evidence is necessary for the Court 
to properly consider and rule on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to 
Suppress. 
The Defendant also requests that a further evidentiary hearing be set so that 
defense counsel can question the prosecution witnesses and present evidence in 
order to develop an appropriate record regarding the existence of the reports and 
their subsequent destruction as it the Defendant's position that this issue is vital to 
his motions filed in this case and to any potential appeal which may be brought if 
the court ultimately denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to 
Suppress. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
It is the position of the Defendant that the existence of police reports, 
written statements or notes surrounding the circumstances of the controlled buy 
referenced in the Affidavit for Search Warrant used to obtain a search warrant to 
4 
search the Defendant's home is the first step to analyzing the Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss based on the destruction of the reports as well as the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress based on an improprieties surrounding the search warrant. It 
is the position of the Defendant as argued at the November 29 , 2007, hearing and 
as set forth in his previous motions that any police reports, field notes, or other 
written documentation pertaining to the alleged controlled buy are discoverable by 
the defense and must be provided pursuant to Rules of Evidence. Further it is the 
position of the Defendant that the destruction of those reports may be considered 
by the court as a basis for a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a Motion to 
Exclude this evidence from consideration n reevaluating the validity of the search 
warrant pursuant to the Franks doctrine. 
Therefore the Defendant respectfully requests that the Court hold a further 
evidentiary hearing to hear evidence regarding the existence of written reports 
pertaining to the controlled buy and reconsider the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and Motion to Suppress based on the new evidence presented at the hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23 rd day of December , 2007. 
JASON SCHATZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day, December 23, 2007,1 personally mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Objection to Order, Renewed Request for 
Evidentiary Hearing, and Motion to Reconsider to the following: 
Judge Maughan 
THIRD DITRICT COURT 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
JACEY SKINNER, #9561 
Office of the District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tim Godfrey 
4521 S. 480 E. 
Murray, UT 84107 
